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ABSTRACT 
We provide a new legal perspective for the antitrust analysis of margin squeeze conducts. 
Building on recent economic analysis, we explain why margin squeeze conducts should solely be 
evaluated under adjusted predatory pricing standards. The adjustment corresponds to an increase 
in the cost benchmark used in the predatory pricing test by including opportunity costs due to 
missed upstream sales. This can reduce both the risks of false-positives and false-negatives in 
margin squeeze cases. We justify this approach by explaining why classic arguments against 
above-cost predatory pricing typically do not hold in vertical structures where margin squeezes 
take place and by presenting case law evidence supporting this adjustment. Our approach can 
help to reconcile the divergent US and EU antitrust stances on margin squeeze. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the last decade, margin squeeze (or price squeeze)1 allegations have featured high in the 
enforcement practice of regulatory and competition authorities, especially in the 
telecommunications sector and other newly liberalized network industries such as gas, electricity 
and postal services.2 Case law has also evolved significantly in both the United States (US) and 
European Union (EU). However, a significant divergence exists between these two jurisdictions 
with respect to the criteria for assessing a margin squeeze conduct.3 This is reflected in the two 
different approaches the US and the EU courts have developed for the antitrust analysis of margin 
squeeze: the regulatory approach and the competition law approach, respectively.4 
According to the US regulatory approach, margin squeezes that are not caught by refusal 
to deal or predatory pricing antitrust laws should be dealt with by regulatory authorities only, 
relying on the economic principles of access pricing.5 This view has been adopted by the US 
Supreme Court in linkLine.6 In contrast, according to the competition law approach, margin 
squeeze should qualify as a standalone abuse of dominance by focusing on the spread between 
                                                 
1 ‘Price squeeze’ is the term most commonly used by courts and commentators in the United States and ‘margin 
squeeze’ in Europe. The terms will be used interchangeably. 
2 See, OECD, Margin Squeeze (2009) for a survey of margin squeeze cases in 25 jurisdictions. The most recent 
example relates to the European Commission imposing a fine of almost 70 million euros on Slovak Telekom and its 
parent company, Deutsche Telekom, for margin squeeze and refusal to deal between 2005 and 2010 in the Slovak 
market for broadband services; see European Commission, MEMO/14/590, ‘Antitrust: Commission Decision on 
Abusive Conduct on Slovak Broadband Markets by Slovak Telekom and Deutsche Telekom - frequently asked 
questions’, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-590_en.htm (visited June 2015). 
3 See George A. Hay and Kathryn McMahon, The Diverging Approach to Price Squeezes in the United States and 
Europe, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 259 (2012); John B. Meisel, The Law and Economics of Margin Squeezes 
in the US Versus the EU, 8 (2) EUR. COMPETITION J. 383 (2012). 
4 See Damien Geradin and Robert O’Donoghue, The Concurrent Application of Competition Law and Regulation: 
the Case of Margin Squeeze Abuses in the Telecommunications Sector, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 355 
(2005). 
5 See, J. Gregory Sidak, Abolishing Price Squeeze as a Theory of Antitrust Liability, 4(2) J. COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. 279 (2008). Closely related to the regulatory approach to margin squeeze are expertise-based arguments and 
the superiority of regulators in addressing competition issues within the areas of their expertise when compared to 
competition law enforcers; see, Erik N. Hovenkamp and Herbert Hovenkamp, The Viability of Antitrust Price 
Squeeze Claims, 51 ARIZONA L. REV. 273 (2009). 
6 Pacific Bell Telephone Company, dba AT&T California, et al v linkLine Communications, Inc., et al., 555 US 438, 
129 S Ct 1109 (2009) [hereinafter linkLine]. The Supreme Court examined independently the lawfulness of the 
upstream and downstream prices of the incumbent and held that in the absence of an upstream duty to deal on the 
upstream market and lack of predatory prices at the retail market, the incumbent ‘is certainly not required to price 
both of these services in a manner that preserves its rivals’ profit margins’, linkLine, at 1119.  Note that the Supreme 
Court ruled that the defendant did not have a duty to deal because it had never voluntarily engaged in selling at the 
wholesale level (absent regulation). 
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wholesale and retail prices, and not on the lawfulness of each price level.7 This position has been 
embraced by the European Courts,8 which have ruled that it is not necessary to establish in 
addition that either the wholesale or retail price is, independently of the claimed squeeze, 
excessive.9 Under the EU competition law approach, the sole issue that should be determined is 
whether the spread between the retail prices charged by a dominant undertaking and the 
wholesale prices it charges its competitors for comparable services is negative or insufficient to 
cover the product-specific costs of the dominant operator for providing its own retail services in 
the downstream market.10 As we shall see, following TeliaSonera,11 such insufficient spread 
could either mean that the competitor could be able ‘to operate at the retail market only at a loss 
or at artificially reduced levels of profitability’.12 
Of course, the divergence that exists between the US and the EU with respect to margin 
squeeze owes much to the institutional differences that exist between these two jurisdictions as 
well as to political economy considerations.13 For example, the forum of US antitrust law is 
primarily the courts, while EU competition law decisions are taken by administrative agencies. 
These differences in the institutional structure of antitrust enforcement have some bearing on how 
courts have regulated the relationship between competition law and regulation. Furthermore, 
unlike the US, most EU Member states have very strong incumbents in utilities markets, most of 
which were state-owed. This may explain the inclusion of positive margins by the Court of 
                                                 
7 See Alberto Heimler, Is a Margin Squeeze an Antitrust or a Regulatory Violation, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. 879 (2010). 
8 Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 14 October 2010–Deutsche Telekom AG v. European Commission, 
Vodafone D2 GmbH, formerly Vodafone AG & Co. KG, formerly Arcor AG & Co. KG and Others (Case C-280/08 
P), ECR 2010 I-09555 [hereinafter Deutsche Telekom 2010]; Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 17 February 
2011 - Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB (Case C-52/09), ECR 2011 I-00527 [hereinafter TeliaSonera]; 
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 10 July 2014 - Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission (Case 
C-295/12 P), not yet published [hereinafter Telefónica 2014]. Note that the EU Courts approach contrasts with that of 
the Common Position of the European Regulators Group and the European Commission on remedies under the new 
regulatory framework for electronic communications which viewed margin squeeze as an anticompetitive effect that 
can be the result of different behaviors such as price discrimination upstream and/or predatory pricing downstream; 
see ERG, ‘Revised ERG Common Position on the Approach to Appropriate Remedies in the ECNS regulatory 
framework’ (May 2006) ERG (06, 33) 38. Traces of the EU approach to margin squeeze abuses can be found in the 
US in the Alcoa decision of the 2nd Circuit, United States v Aluminun Co. of America et al, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 
1945) [hereinafter Alcoa]. 
9 See e.g. Deutsche Telekom 2010, supra note 8, ¶ 183; TeliaSonera, supra note 8, ¶ 34, 99. 
10 Commission Decision of 21 May 2003 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579–Deutsche Telekom AG), 2003 O.J. (L 263) 9 [hereinafter Deutsche Telekom 
2003], ¶ 107; Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom v. Commission (2008) E.C.R. II-477 ¶ 167 [hereinafter Deutsche 
Telekom 2008]; Deutsche Telekom 2010, supra note 8, ¶ 159. 
11 TeliaSonera, supra note 8. 
12 Id. at. ¶ 33. 
13 See e.g. Daniel A. Crane, linkLine’s Institutional Suspicions, CATO SUPREME COURT REV. 111 (2008-2009); 
John Vickers, Competition Policy and Property Rights, 120 ECON. J. 375 (2010). 
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Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the grounds that the Court wants to avoid margin 
squeeze that aims at blocking the expansion of competitors at the retail level.14 Finally, in the 
telecommunications sector, the EU competition law approach to margin squeeze seems to 
complement ex ante regulation, and in particular, by the ‘ladder of investment’ approach applied 
in Local Loop Unbundling (LLU) regulation.15 Aiming at balancing static with dynamic 
efficiency considerations, this approach is based on the idea that the regulator should encourage 
access to wholesale markets by setting very low access prices for the network elements that are 
too expensive for the new entrant to duplicate. Regulatory prices are increased as soon as new 
entrants are able to consolidate their market position and thus able to move up ‘the ladder of 
investment’. Hence, one may argue that the regulatory approach of the ‘ladder of investment’ 
underlies the European ‘theory of harm’, in the sense that incumbents engage in margin squeeze 
conduct to prevent rivals from competing in greater parts of the supply chain. Such ‘dynamic 
rationale’ is, however, absent in the US. This is because the stringent unbundling rules enacted in 
the wake of the US Telecommunications Act 1996 so as to facilitate rapid market entry of 
competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs),16 have been since 2005 progressively phased out 
due to concerns raised on their impact on investment incentives.17 The focus, however, of this 
paper is on competition policy, and not on the issues that arise in ex ante regulation.18 Therefore, 
while we acknowledge the abovementioned institutional and substantive considerations, our aim 
here is not to explore these further, but to rather highlight the enforcement-related issues that may 
arise from the abovementioned diverging approaches to margin squeeze. 
                                                 
14 See Section II. 
15 See, e.g., Martin Cave and Ingo Vogelsang, How Access Pricing and Entry Interact, 27 TELECOM. POLICY 717 
(2003), and Martin Cave, Encouraging Infrastructure Competition via the Ladder of Investment, 30 TELECOM. 
POLICY 223 (2006). Note, however, that the ‘ladder of investment’ approach has mixed theoretical implications, 
and led to weak empirical results, as shown, respectively, by Marc Bourreau and Joeffrey Drouard, Progressive 
Entry and the Incentives to Invest in Alternative Infrastructures, 45 J. REGULATORY ECON. 329 (2014), and 
Maya Bacache, Marc Bourreau, and Germain Gaudin, Dynamic Entry and Investment in New Infrastructures: 
Empirical Evidence from the Fixed Broadband Industry, 44 REV. IND. ORGAN. 179 (2014). 
16  The Telecommunications Act constitutes one of the numerous amendments to the Communications Act 1934, the 
governing statute for the regulation of all sectors of the telecommunications industry in the US. The mandatory 
unbundling provisions are enshrined in Section 251(d) of the US Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
104, 110 Stat. 56, codified at 47 U.S.C. §§151 et. Seq. and were implemented by FCC’s order on: ‘Implementation 
of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996’, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R 
15499, 4 Comm. Reg. (P &F) 844-9 (1996)’. 
17 See, e.g., Jerry A Hausman and J. Gregory Sidak, Did Mandatory Unbundling Achieve its Purpose? Empirical 
Evidence from Five Countries, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 173 (2005). 
18 For an analysis of ex ante treatment of margin squeeze by European regulatory authorities, see Germain Gaudin 
and Claudia Saavedra, Ex ante margin squeeze tests in the telecommunications industry: What is a reasonably 
efficient operator? 38 TELECOM. POLICY 157 (2014). 
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Both approaches raise potentially problematic issues. On the one hand, the regulatory 
approach may give rise to false negative errors (under-deterrence), as it invites the question 
whether a margin squeeze which harms competition through prices that, nonetheless, respect the 
standard Courts’ definitions of predatory pricing and refusal to deal could still be punished by 
Courts as anticompetitive conduct.19 On the other hand, the competition law approach may give 
rise to false positive errors (over-deterrence) because of its broad definition of margin squeeze, 
which may also include situations where the competitor’s downstream costs do not exceed the 
difference between downstream and upstream prices. As a result, dominant firms could be 
prevented from engaging in pro-competitive conducts that lower consumer price and increase 
total surplus. Indeed, because of the so-called ‘umbrella effect’,20 a dominant firm would face a 
de facto price floor at the retail level once the wholesale price is set, if squeeze is too broadly 
defined and punished by law. 
In this paper, we suggest a different approach in order to overcome the abovementioned 
shortcomings. This approach consists of evaluating margin squeeze conducts solely under 
adjusted predatory pricing standards. By adjusted predatory standards we mean: (i) the inclusion 
of opportunity costs in a price-cost comparison test that are easily identifiable in the case of 
vertically related markets, and (ii) an assessment of an exclusionary strategy. The argument is 
structured as follows. First, we explain why in markets where there is an upstream duty to deal 
enforced by Courts,21 a variation of standard Courts’ definition of predatory pricing by way of 
                                                 
19 To this effect see Nicholas Economides, Vertical Leverage and the Sacrifice Principle: Why the Supreme Court 
Got Trinko Wrong, 61(3) NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 379 (2005) (arguing inter alia that the 
examination of each price level separately for evidence of a discrete abuse fails to take into account of the dominant 
firm’s ability to engage in vertical leveraging). See also, Heimler, supra note 7. 
20 See Dennis W. Carlton, Should “Price Squeeze” be a Recognized Form of Anticompetitive Conduct? 4(2) J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 271 (2008), and Sidak, supra note 5. 
21 While the classic US duty to deal doctrine was established in the United States v. Colgate & Company, 250 U.S. 
300 (1919) subsequent Supreme Court decisions have in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Ski Corporation, 472 
U.S. 585 (1985) [hereinafter Aspen Skiing] and Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 
398 (2004) [hereinafter Trinko] significantly reduced the circumstances where a duty to deal will be established 
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, particularly in regulated industries and/or where there has been no prior course 
of dealing. In Aspen Skiing, the Court ruled that a monopoly firm has a duty not to exclude rivals by a refusal to deal 
unless there are ‘valid business reasons for the refusal’, at 597. The monopolist, Aspen Skiing, voluntarily sold the 
product and then stopped selling it and discriminated against rivals. This fact was treated by the Court as a basis for 
inferring anticompetitive intent (the discontinuation by Aspen Skiing ‘suggested a willingness to forsake short-term 
profits to achieve an anticompetitive end’ at 409). The Supreme Court in Trinko reconceived Aspen as an exception 
to the broader rule that monopoly firms may unilaterally refuse to deal with competitors. The Court distinguished 
Trinko from Aspen Skiing as, unlike the latter case, the monopolist Verizon did not voluntarily sell the product (i.e. 
the leased UNEs) and then ceased selling them or discriminated against rivals. Instead, the market for leased UNEs 
was created by regulation. This led the Supreme Court to assert that Aspen Skiing was already ‘at or near the outer 
boundary of Section 2 liability’, at 409. In the EU, a regulatory duty to deal can be enforced under competition laws 
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including opportunity costs in the price-cost comparison test would suffice to identify any margin 
squeeze. Then, we build on recent economic analyses of margin squeeze conducts in order to 
identify their different effects. In doing so, we explain why margin squeezes which may harm 
competition resemble predatory pricing strategies, and why other types of margin squeeze 
typically would harm competitors, but not competition. We show why classic arguments against 
the use of above-cost predatory pricing test typically do not hold in vertically-related markets 
where margin squeeze takes place. Finally, building on the case law, we also provide groundings 
for the Courts to use this approach. We believe that this novel approach to margin squeeze could 
reconcile the two opposing transatlantic views on the conduct. 
Relying on adjusted-predatory pricing standards to evaluate margin squeeze conducts 
presents three main benefits. The first one is that it furnishes a simple, reliable price-cost test to 
identify margin squeeze conducts as anticompetitive or monopolizing. This, in turn, improves 
legal certainty. Furthermore, it presents the advantage of implementation in both the US and the 
EU.  The second one relates to the fact that the suggested approach allows for the detection of 
monopolizing margin squeeze conducts which would pass a standard predatory pricing test, 
where opportunity costs are omitted. It does so while avoiding classic problems related to above-
cost predatory pricing standards (e.g., administrability and predictability of the rule), because it 
restricts the use of such standards to vertically related markets. This, in turn, reduces the risk of 
under-deterrence. Finally, the suggested approach relies on the predatory pricing requirement that 
the alleged conduct should lead to the actual or likely exclusion or marginalisation of competitors 
from the market.22 Hence, it provides a safe harbor for margin squeezes which harm competitors, 
by reducing their profits, but not competition (because competitors remain in the market) and 
which lower prices for consumers. This, in turn, reduces the risk of over-deterrence. 
Before proceeding, an important caveat should be noted here. There is a long-standing 
academic and policy debate - especially in the EU context - on whether margin squeeze should be 
recognised as a distinct, stand-alone category of abuse of dominance or whether it should be 
treated in an ‘equivalent fashion’ to other established forms of abuse, such as refusal to deal and 
                                                                                                                                                              
by competition authorities and courts, as the presence of ex-ante regulation does not prevent the application of an ex 
post duty to deal, see Deutsche Telekom 2003 and Deutsche Telekom 2010. 
22 See Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 27 March 2012 - Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet (Case C- 
209/10) (2012) ECR I-0000 [hereinafter Post Danmark], ‘Competition on the merits may, by definition, lead to the 
departure from the market or the marginalisation of competitors that are less efficient and so less attractive to 
consumers from the point of view of, among other things, price, choice, quality or innovation’, ¶22. 
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predatory pricing.23 Mindful of the controversy surrounding the nature and treatment of margin 
squeeze abuse, our aim here is not to engage in a normative discussion on this issue. We are, 
therefore, not concerned with whether margin squeeze should be treated in an analogous fashion 
to refusal to deal24 (which would, amongst others, entail relying on an anticompetitive foreclosure 
test) or to predatory pricing (which would entail relying on a profit sacrifice test). On the 
contrary, we take a positive approach to the issue, as our suggested test builds on the prevailing 
treatment of margin squeeze in the US and the EU. In light of the above, our ambition is much 
narrower and critical: to argue that margin squeeze cases should face the abovementioned two-
fold test.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section II, we summarise the 
current state of antitrust analysis of both predatory pricing and margin squeeze in the US and the 
EU. In Section III, we propose an above-cost predatory pricing approach to antitrust analysis of 
margin squeeze, and in Section IV we discuss this approach in light of the literature and case law 
on above-cost predatory pricing. Section V concludes. 
 
 
II. PREDATORY PRICING AND MARGIN SQUEEZE: WHERE DO WE STAND? 
This section provides a brief account of current antitrust approaches to predatory pricing and 
margin squeeze in the US and the EU. We consider both types of abuses because our proposed 
approach to margin squeeze, detailed in Section III below, builds on current US and EU 
approaches to predatory pricing. Our aim is to highlight the flaws of the existing antitrust 
treatment of margin squeeze and to demonstrate that the structural transatlantic differences are 
larger in the case of margin squeeze than in that of predatory pricing. 
                                                 
23 The literature on the issue is vast. In the US context see Heimler, supra note 7; Carlton, supra note 20. In the EU 
context see Liam Colley and Sebastian Burnside, Margin Squeeze Abuse, 2 EUR. COMPETITION J. 185 (2006); 
Alison Jones, Identifying an Identifying an Unlawful Margin Squeeze: The Recent Judgments of the Court of Justice 
in Deutsche Telekom and TeliaSonera, 13 CYELS 161 (2010). See further OECD, supra note 2 and David Spector, 
Some Economics of Margin Squeeze 1 REVUE CONCURRENCES 21 (2008). 
24 The European Commission for example in its Guidance on Article 102 document appears to establish a parallel 
between the margin squeeze doctrine and that of refusal to deal, see European Commission, Guidance on the 
Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 [Article 102] of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary 
Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45) 7, (EC) [hereinafter Guidance on Article 102], ¶ 69.  
8 
 
 
A. PREDATORY PRICING 
Predatory pricing is inherently a dynamic strategy typically taking place in a single market, 
whereby a firm incurs a sacrifice in the short run to exclude competitors, in order to acquire a 
dominant position allowing it to recoup its losses and earn supra-competitive profits in the long 
run.25 This pattern of sacrifice-then-recoupment is found in the case law as well. 
While the US and the EU courts seem to agree on the abovementioned mechanism that 
leads to predation, they nonetheless disagree on the formulation of the legal rule that should be 
applied. Hence, the legal rules adopted respectively in the US and the EU for the assessment of 
predation differ substantially. Briefly, in the EU the test for predation requires an assessment of 
(i) the dominant firm’s ex ante perspective of whether the conduct is likely to lead to a sacrifice 
and (ii) whether this is likely to lead to actual or likely anticompetitive foreclosure. In the US, the 
antitrust plaintiff must demonstrate both sacrifice (in the sense of sales below cost) and a market 
structure conducive to recoupment. In the words of the US Supreme Court in the Brooke Group26 
case – the landmark case on predatory pricing – the successful plaintiff should prove that there is 
a ‘dangerous probability’ that the predator would recoup its investment in below cost prices.27 In 
sharp contrast to the US approach, the EU Courts do not require recoupment as a prerequisite in 
predatory pricing cases.28 However, this does not mean that the likelihood of recoupment is 
completely irrelevant. Rather, it seems implicit in the notion of dominant position; in other words 
                                                 
25 There are several existing theories of predation which explain how the dominant firm could earn its position 
allowing for recoupment by forcing competitors to exit the market; e.g., signal jamming, financial predation with 
imperfect financial markets, reputation. See e.g. MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY; THEORY AND 
PRACTICE (CUP 2004) 415-422. However, the European Commission notes that a dominant position can be 
acquired without exclusion of competitors, if the sacrifice phase led to disciplining the market; see Guidance on 
Article 102, supra note 24, ¶ 69. 
26 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) [hereinafter Brooke Group]. 
27 Id. The Supreme Court confirmed this position in the linkLine case and in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons 
Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 549 U.S. 312 (2007).  See also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 US 574, 590-591 (1986). For a discussion of the difficulties associated with recoupment see HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE (West 
Group 2005) 370. 
28 For the most recent pronouncement on recoupment see Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 2 April 2009 - 
France Télécom SA v. Commission (Case C-202/07 P), (2009) ECR I-2369. For a criticism of the EU approach to 
recoupment see Michal Gal, Below-Cost Price Alignment: Meeting or Beating Competition? The France Télécom 
Case, 28(6) ECLR 382 (2007). Advocate General Fennelly and Mazák have argued in favor of incorporating 
recoupment in the legal test for predation. In Compagnie Maritime Belge, AG Fennely suggested that some form of 
recoupment ‘should be part of the test for abusive low pricing by dominant undertakings’, see Opinion of AG 
Fennelly in Joined Cases C-395/96P and 396/96P, Compagnie Maritime Belge NV and Dafna Lines v. Commission 
(1998) ECR I-1365 ¶ 136. See also Opinion of AG Mazák in Case C-202/07 P, France Télécom SA v. Commission 
[2008] ECR I-02369 ¶ 59-60. For the opposite view see Cyril Ritter, Does the Law of Predatory Pricing and Cross-
Subsidization Need a Radical Rethink?, 27(4) WORLD COMPETITION 613 (2004). 
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that a dominant firm having disciplined or excluded its rivals from the market, will be able to 
raise prices and recoup loses made during the predatory period and harm consumers.29 The 
Commission in its 2005 Discussion Paper came to a similar conclusion noting that ‘as dominance 
is already established this normally means that entry barriers are sufficiently high to presume the 
possibility to recoup’.30 However, a degree of caution should be applied to such a statement, 
because dominance can be defined according to different thresholds of market shares, which, in 
turn, may affect the ability of the dominant firm to recoup its losses. 
Despite the abovementioned differences, both in the US and the EU, the Areeda-Turner 
rule has proved extremely influential on assessing the sacrifice requirement.31 Areeda and Turner 
sought to formulate a cost-based price test as a workable test for distinguishing between 
predatory pricing and competitive pricing. They proposed to consider predatory a price that falls 
below short run marginal cost and argued that such a simple test would capture conduct that was 
likely to exclude equally efficient firms from the market. However, acknowledging the 
difficulties associated with calculating marginal cost, they suggested relying instead on average 
variable cost (AVC) as a convenient proxy for enforcement.32 Hence, under the Areeda-Turner 
rule prices are presumed unlawful when they are set below AVC. 
The case law supports the Areeda-Turner approach of a price-cost test to assess sacrifice. 
In the US, the Supreme Court in Brooke Group33 established that a successful plaintiff must 
prove that the alleged prices fell below an appropriate measure of cost. The Court, however, 
declined to ‘resolve the conflict among the lower courts over the appropriate measure of costs’,34 
despite the fact that the parties had relied on the AVC as the relevant measure of cost. 
Nonetheless, subsequent case law confirms that AVC is generally considered to be the 
appropriate standard.35 
                                                 
29 To this effect see John Temple Lang and Robert O’Donoghue, Defining Legitimate Competition: How to Clarify 
Pricing Abuses under Article 82EC, 26 (2) FORDHAM INT’l L. J. 83 (2002). 
30 European Commission, Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses, 
2005, Brussels, ¶ 122. 
31 See Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act, 88 HARVARD L. REV. 697 (1975). 
32 Id. at pp. 716-718. 
33 Brooke Group, supra note 26. 
34 Id, at 222. 
35 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Areeda-Turner Test for Exclusionary Pricing: A Critical Journal, 46 REV. IND. 
ORGAN. 209 (2015), noting that ‘every federal circuit except the Eleventh has embraced some variation of the test 
that Areeda and Turner proposed’. 
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In the EU, Courts have considered the Areeda-Turner test as a starting point, but they 
have introduced some important modifications. Hence, the legal test established in the AKZO36 
case and refined in Tetra Pak II37 defines as anticompetitive (i) prices below AVC, and also (ii) 
prices above AVC, but below average total cost (ATC) ‘if they are determined as part of a plan 
for eliminating a competitor’.38 In the former case, foreclosure is implied by the dominant firm’s 
pricing strategy, which would typically prove irrational if it were not for excluding competitors. 
In other words, the AKZO ruling sets out a presumption that there is no profit-maximizing reason 
for pricing below costs.39 In the latter case, however, establishing anticompetitive foreclosure 
becomes important. As the Commission puts it, a dominant undertaking engages in predatory 
pricing ‘so as to foreclose or be likely to foreclose one or more of its actual or potential 
competitors’.40 Therefore, the notion of foreclosure is central to predatory pricing strategies, and 
this is clearly shown in the case law.41 In this regard, predatory pricing antitrust cases typically 
involve exclusion (or likelihood of) actual competitors or foreclosure of potential competitors, 
which could serve the market if they were to enter. In economic theory, however, a distinction 
exists between the use of low pricing strategies to exclude competitors (predatory pricing) and to 
deter entry of rivals (‘limit pricing’, whereby a dominant firm charges less than its short run 
profit-maximising price in order to deter entry). 
 
B. MARGIN SQUEEZE 
In contrast to predatory pricing, margin squeeze is a conduct that can only arise in vertically 
related markets, where a vertically integrated firm, dominant at the upstream level, faces 
competition in the downstream segment from competitors who rely on its upstream input. 
According to the EU Courts and authorities,42 a margin squeeze occurs when the spread between 
                                                 
36 Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v Commission (1991), ECR-I-3359 [hereinafter AKZO]. 
37 Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak International SA v Commission (1994), ECR II-755, affirmed in C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak 
International SA v. Commission (1996) ECR I-5951. 
38 AKZO, supra note 36, ¶ 72. Note that the AKZO requirements for lawful pricing are thus stricter than the Areeda-
Turner test, as under the AKZO test there can be predation when prices are above AVC. 
39 However, prices below AVC may be part of a pricing plan for new products or can occur in two-sided markets; see 
Guidance on Article 102, supra note 24 ¶ 26 fn. 3. In this regard, AKZO only sets out a presumption of 
anticompetitive conduct. Circumstances such as these referred to in the Guidance paper could thus be recognized and 
the presumption rebutted. 
40 See Guidance on Article 102, ¶ 63. 
41 See e.g. AKZO, ¶ 41-42; Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fifth Chamber) – France Télécom SA v. 
Commission France (Case T-340/03) (2007) ECR II-117, ¶130. 
42 Deutsche Telekom 2003, ¶ 102, 140; Deutsche Telekom 2008, ¶ 237; Deutsche Telekom 2010, ¶ 177 and Summary 
of Commission Decision of 4 July 2007 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case 
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the price charged to competitors upstream and the price charged to the dominant undertaking’s 
own customers downstream is either negative or insufficient for competitors as efficient as the 
dominant undertaking to cover its specific downstream costs. Hence, a margin squeeze occurs 
when the as-efficient competitor (AEC) test fails. This test compares the integrated firm’s retail 
price, p, to its upstream price, a, and its own downstream costs, c, and is satisfied when p ≥ a + 
c.43 
Such an approach is consistent with general welfare considerations (in so far as it protects 
competition in the form of as or more efficient competitors as opposed to less efficient ones) and 
is also consistent with the principle of legal certainty, as it is based on the integrated firm’s own 
prices and costs.44 Hence, in the EU, margin squeeze is recognized as a freestanding violation of 
Article 102 TFEU subjected to the as-efficient competitor test.45 In the TeliaSonera judgement, 
the CJEU clarified that the Oscar Bronner requirements do not need to be satisfied in order to 
establish margin squeeze liability.46 Refusal to supply and margin squeeze are thus treated as two 
distinct infringements, with the latter requiring a less demanding test. The Court, instead, held 
that when a dominant firm fixes the ‘terms of trade’ with its downstream competitors, it might be 
found to abuse its dominant position, when the terms of dealing are ‘disadvantageous’ for the 
                                                                                                                                                              
COMP/38.784– Wanadoo España v Telefónica), 2008 O.J. (C 83) 6, ¶ 312; and Telefónica 2014, ¶ 75. See also the 
Commission’s adoption of interim measures in the Napier Brown v British Sugar, Case No IV/30.178 Napier 
Brown/British Sugar (1988) OJ L284/41, 19.10.1988 [hereinafter Napier Brown 1988], the Commission explicitly 
held that the existence of a margin squeeze should be tested on the basis of the dominant firm’s charges and costs 
and that it is necessary to show that the margin is ‘insufficient to reflect the dominant company’s own costs and 
transformation…with the result that competition in the derived product is restricted’, ¶ 66. See also Case T-5/97, 
Industrie des Poudres Sphériques SA v Commission (2000) ECR II-3755, ¶ 179. The most authoritative discussion of 
the appropriate test for margin squeeze stems from the CJEU’s preliminary ruling in TeliaSonera. The CJEU 
acknowledges that in principle the test should be whether the dominant firm ‘would have been sufficiently efficient 
to offer its retail services to end users otherwise that at a loss if it had first been obliged to pay wholesale prices for 
the intermediary services’ that is whether the margin passes the AEC test, see ¶ 32, 41, 42. The Court however did 
not clearly reject the Reasonably Efficient Competitor (REC) test and established three scenarios where it might be 
relevant to apply it, see ¶ 45. 
43 The AEC test is also referred to as the ‘imputation test’. 
44 See Deutsche Telekom 2008, ¶ 167-168, 192, 200-203, TeliaSonera, ¶ 41-48, and Telefónica 2014, ¶ 124. 
45 See supra note 9. 
46 TeliaSonera, ¶ 54-58. In Oscar Bronner, the CJEU spelled out three conditions that must be met before a refusal to 
supply an input by the dominant firm can be considered abusive: (i) the refusal must be likely to eliminate all 
competition in the secondary market on the part of the person requesting access; (ii) there is no objective justification 
for the refusal; and (iii) the service in itself is indispensable to carrying on that person’s business, inasmuch as there 
is no actual or potential substitute in existence; see Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & co. KG v. 
MediaprintZeitungs –und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG (1998) ECR I-7791, ¶ 41). See also Guidance on 
Article 102, supra note 24, ¶ 80, where the conditions that must be met for the establishment of a refusal to deal or 
margin squeeze set out by the Commission are essentially identical to those established by the CJEU in Bronner. 
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new entrants.47 Indispensability of the wholesale input is not, therefore, required for liability, 
although it ‘might be relevant’ when assessing the effects of the margin squeeze.48 In the absence 
of the abovementioned conditions, however, it is necessary to demonstrate that the existence of 
the squeeze makes market penetration more difficult for competitors.49 
An important remark is that, under EU laws, there is no direct need to prove competitor 
foreclosure in order to substantiate a margin squeeze claim, as long as one shows potential 
anticompetitive effects of the pricing conduct; as these effects are necessary in order to qualify 
the pricing practice as an abuse of dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU.50 
As further explained in TeliaSonera, a squeeze exists when an AEC operates in the market ‘at a 
loss or at artificially reduced levels of profitability’.51 While the potentially exclusionary effect of 
the pricing practice is ‘probable’52 in the case of a negative margin (i.e. when the wholesale price 
is higher than the dominant firm’s retail price), in the case of a positive margin it must be 
demonstrated that that the conduct is ‘likely to have the consequence that it would be at least 
more difficult for the operators concerned to trade on the market concerned’.53 This can be put in 
perspective with the two-fold AKZO standard for predatory pricing mentioned above, whereby 
prices below AVC are presumed predatory, and prices between AVC and ATC are punished only 
if they form part of an exclusionary strategy. As will be shown in Section III B, the assessment of 
the exclusionary effect of a price squeeze with positive margin is necessary in order to distinguish 
between sub-categories of margin squeeze, which have different effects on competition and 
consumer welfare. 
                                                 
47 TeliaSonera, ¶ 54. The Court diverged from the opinion of Advocate General Mazák who had argued that absent a 
duty to deal, either imposed by sector specific regulation or because the Oscar Bronner conditions were satisfied, 
there is ‘no independent competitive harm caused by the margin squeeze above and beyond the harm which would 
result from a duty to deal violation at the wholesale level. See Opinion of AG Mazák in Case C-52/09 
Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera AB, ¶ 11-20. See also Damien Geradin, Refusal to Supply and Margin Squeeze: A 
Discussion of Why The ‘Telefonica Exemptions are Wrong, (Tilec Discussion Paper No. 2011-009, 2011). 
48 TeliaSonera, ¶ 69 and 70-71 (‘when access to the wholesale input is indispensable potential anticompetitive effects 
are probable’.). For a criticism of this approach see Hendrik Auf’mkolk, The ‘Feedback Effect’ of Applying EU 
Competition Law to Regulated Industries: Doctrinal Contamination in the Case of Margin Squeeze, 1 J. EUR. 
COMP L & PRACTICE 1 (2012). 
49 Deutsche Telekom 2010. 
50 See TeliaSonera, ¶ 27, 61. 
51 Id, ¶ 33. 
52 Id. ¶ 73. 
53 Id, ¶ 74. See Nicola Petit, Price Squeezes with Positive Margins in EU Competition Law: Anatomy of an Economic 
and Legal Zombie, 2 REVUE DU DROIT DES INDUSTRIES DE RESEAU 123 (2014), on the inconsistency 
between anticompetitiveness of a positive margin squeeze as in the TeliaSonera judgement and the subsequent 
PostDanmark judgment. 
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In stark contrast, in the US margin squeeze does not constitute a standalone violation of 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court’s decision in linkLine has eliminated the 
possibility – that existed since the Alcoa decision54 – of maintaining an independent margin 
squeeze action, if there is no antitrust duty to deal. The primary reason for rejecting the pricing 
spread concept appears to be administrative concerns.55 Margin squeezing behavior must instead 
be assessed as a constructive refusal to deal56 or as an instance of predatory pricing.57 An unfair 
or inadequate margin itself is not illegal. It important to stress, however, that the US Supreme 
Court has yet to rule on margin squeeze, when there exists a duty to deal enforced under antitrust 
laws; precisely the case we study in this paper.58 
Finally, in the case of margin squeezes that arise in regulated sectors, in the EU the 
presence of sector-specific regulation does not prevent the application of competition law and the 
margin squeeze concept, provided that the vertically integrated firm retained some scope to avoid 
the squeeze even if it can only do so by raising retail prices.59 By contrast, in the US, the presence 
of sector-specific regulation excludes the application of antitrust to the price levels that comprise 
the squeeze.60 
While margin squeeze conducts are assessed in different ways in the US and the EU, this 
section showed that alleged predatory pricing conducts are evaluated according to more similar 
approaches. In other words, they both follow the sacrifice-then-recoupment framework 
elaborated in the economics literature, even though some differences remain in practice. With this 
in mind, the following section will provide an alternative approach to the antitrust assessment of 
margin squeeze – the above-cost predatory pricing standard for margin squeeze conduct – which 
may reconcile the transatlantic differences with respect to this conduct. 
 
                                                 
54 Alcoa, supra note 8. 
55 The Court ruled that ‘[i]nstitutional concerns’ counsel against adopting a stand-alone price squeeze theory, at 
linkLine 1120-1121. The Court emphasized in particular the difficulty that exists of administering a rule that would 
require judges ‘to police’ both retail and wholesale prices and ensure that the ‘interaction’ between them does not 
‘squeeze’ rival firms, and the elusiveness in trying to apply a requirement that a monopolist leave its rivals a ‘fair’ or 
‘adequate’ margin; linkLine at 1120-1121. 
56 Under the standards developed in Trinko. 
57 Under the standards developed in Brooke Group. 
58 See also Heimler, supra note 7.  
59 Deutsche Telekom 2010, ¶ 181-182. 
60 See linkLine. 
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III. AN ABOVE-COST PREDATORY PRICING APPROACH TO MARGIN SQUEEZE  
Prior to introducing our approach to assessing margin squeeze conduct, it is important to note that 
we focus on conducts that arise in industries where the integrated firm faces a duty to deal61 
which is enforced by courts. That is, either an antitrust or a regulatory duty to deal in Europe62 or 
an antitrust duty to deal in the US.63 This allows us to consider cases in which both the EU and 
the US Courts could potentially intervene. 
 
A. NEW STANDARD FOR MARGIN SQUEEZE CONDUCTS 
Our approach is summarized in an above-cost predatory pricing standard for margin squeeze 
conducts. Such a standard builds on the assessments of predatory pricing conducts, while taking 
into account the specificities of the vertical structure in which a margin squeeze takes place. Its 
goal is to reduce both risks of under- and over-deterrence as compared to current approaches, 
while being administrable. 
 
Our standard requires the following: 
1) A comparative test of the dominant firm’s prices and costs, including opportunity costs of 
missed upstream sales; 
2) An assessment of an exclusionary strategy, as in the case of predatory pricing. 
 
Our suggested standard to margin squeeze conduct may reduce the risks of under-
deterrence under US laws64 and over-deterrence under EU laws. With respect to the former, 
taking into account the opportunity costs of missed upstream sales when assessing whether prices 
                                                 
61 The duty to deal might be either a non-excessive price or a rule prescribing the integrated firm to supply its rivals 
or not discriminate against its rivals. See e.g. Aspen Skiing, supra note 21, where the defendant refused to sell at 
duopoly prices to a competitor. 
62 See e.g. Deutsche Telekom 2010. See also Napier Brown 1988, where both an abusive refusal to supply and a 
margin squeeze were found. See further Industrie des Poudres Sphériques, which confirmed the Commission’s non-
infringement decision as alternative sources of supply were available and the alleged margin squeeze was rejected. 
63 See supra note 21. The Court in Trinko did not make unilateral refusals to deal legal per se; it held that freedom to 
deal is paramount and that the facts of Aspen must be treated as an exception to this principle. See Howard 
Shelanski, The Case for Rebalancing Antitrust and Regulation, 109 MICHIGAN L. REV. 683 (2011) 698-9 and 
Eleanor Fox, Is there Life in Aspen after Trinko? The Silent Revolution of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 73 
ANTITRUST L. J. 153 (2005-2006) 168. 
64 Whereas the Supreme Court has yet to state on assessing a margin squeeze conduct when there is an antitrust duty 
to deal, it explained that the AEC test ‘lacks any grounding in [its] antitrust jurisprudence’. See, linkLine 1121-1122; 
and Heimler, supra note 7. This leaves the door open to under-deterrence under an antitrust duty to deal in case the 
Supreme Court does not recognize that a monopolizing strategy can occur with above-cost prices. 
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are below some measure of costs enables to detect dominant undertakings’ anticompetitive or 
monopolizing conducts in cases where both wholesale and retail prices are set at such levels that 
escape the refusal to deal or predatory pricing laws respectively. With respect to the latter, the 
requirement that the conduct is exclusionary (in the sense of impeding an actual competitor who 
served consumers from doing so and deterring entry of a competitor who would serve consumers) 
may restrict the scope of potential liability of a margin squeeze under EU laws, as allowed in 
TeliaSonera. The benefit of this narrower definition is that it does not prevent dominant firms 
from engaging in pro-consumer price-cutting, which would allow more-efficient competitors to 
remain in the market, albeit making a lower, positive profit. 
Overall, our approach only focuses on anticompetitive and monopolizing margin squeeze 
conducts. We refer to such conducts as those where the incumbent sets a retail price at such 
levels that do not allow a competitor who is at least as efficient as the incumbent at the retail level 
and who would serve the retail market absent a squeeze, to earn positive profits. 
In the following sections we explain in greater detail the suggested two-prong test of 
margin squeeze conduct, and why it performs better than current approaches. Finally, we discuss 
its administrability. 
 
B. OPPORTUNITY COSTS OF MISSED UPSTREAM SALES 
As already discussed, a convenient way to detect all margin squeezes is the ‘as-efficient 
competitor’ (AEC) test. An important observation is that the definition of margin squeeze 
according to the AEC test includes both refusal to deal and predatory pricing as subcases of 
margin squeeze conduct, as both too high an input price and too low (i.e. below cost) a retail price 
can induce a margin squeeze. However, this definition may also capture some conducts that do 
not correspond to refusal to deal or to predatory pricing practices, where the vertically integrated 
firm may earn a positive profit while applying a margin squeeze to monopolize the market.65 
Therefore, standard Courts’ criteria for assessing refusal to deal or predatory pricing practices, 
which include inter alia a below-cost requirement (such that the dominant, integrated firm incurs 
losses in the short-run) would not encompass this specific case of margin squeeze. 
                                                 
65 This type of conduct corresponds to what Herbert Hovenkamp calls ‘long-run anticompetitive’ pricing strategies, 
in that it is ‘sustainable’ in the long-run, as the dominant firm earns a positive profit, see PHILLIP AREEDA AND 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR 
APPLICATION (2nd edn, Aspen Publishers 2002), ¶ 736. 
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To illustrate the under-deterrence problem under the current US approach, consider the 
following example. An incumbent telecommunications firm owns a residential access network, 
which costs $5 per month and per consumer line to maintain. It must grant access to the network 
to a downstream competitor at a (maximum) price of $10 because of a duty to deal.66 The 
incumbent’s retail cost is $20 per month per consumer, whereas the competitor is more efficient, 
with a retail cost of $18. The competitor needs to rent one access line for each of its customers. 
Following a standard predatory pricing test, the incumbent is allowed to set its retail price 
at any level equal to or above $25 per month; the sum of its upstream and downstream costs. 
However, the competitor cannot set a price lower than $28 without making a loss. Therefore, the 
incumbent may force its competitor to exit the market while respecting standard predatory pricing 
laws by setting a price between $25 and $28, and then benefit from a dominant position (due, 
e.g., to barriers to entry) downstream and recoup its losses.67 In doing so, the incumbent would 
only earn between $0 and $3 per month per consumer in the short run, as compared to $5 in the 
case where it would not squeeze its competitor. However, it could then increase its retail price in 
the long-run to recoup this foregone profit, once the competitor has left the market. Consumers 
would likely be worse off due to the monopolization, as follows from standard predatory pricing 
strategies. 
This above-cost predatory strategy is not possible when we take into account the 
opportunity cost of a missed upstream sale in the cost calculations for the predatory pricing test. 
The opportunity cost is what the incumbent foregoes (one upstream sale) when it decides to serve 
the retail market itself; in our example, this corresponds to the difference between network access 
price, and cost, i.e., $5. This represents the ‘sacrifice’ the incumbent bears in the short-run when 
engaging in a margin squeeze. Following our adjusted standard, the incumbent cannot set a retail 
price below $30. Therefore, the competitor, who is the most efficient downstream firm, can serve 
the retail market at a price between $28 and $30. 
                                                 
66 A wholesale price set through a duty to deal can be above cost if the incumbent has to be compensated, for 
instance, for investment in Universal Service Obligations; see, e.g., Heimler, supra note 7. By contrast, when the 
upstream price is set at the level of the upstream cost by the duty to deal, i.e., $5 in our example, then all margin 
squeeze conducts would be detected by both the classic and adjusted predatory pricing tests, which would be 
equivalent. See, e.g., Jan Bouckaert and Frank Verboven, Price Squeezes in a Regulatory Environment, 26 (3) J. 
REGULATORY ECON. 321 (2004). 
67 Several theories of predatory pricing, building on dynamic sacrifice-then-recoupment strategies, provide 
arguments for why the incumbent could find it more profitable to monopolize the market than to serve its competitor 
and why the competitor could not sustain a price war when it makes a negative profit. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton and 
David S. Scharfstein, A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting, 80 AMERICAN 
ECON. REV.  93 (1990); and MOTTA, supra note 25, for a review. 
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As several scholars have already observed,68 including the opportunity cost that the 
dominant, vertically integrated firm incurs by a missed sale at the upstream level in the (marginal 
cost based) Areeda-Turner test is equivalent to the AEC test for margin squeeze.69 The benefit of 
presenting this test as one for predatory pricing is that it could be endorsed by US Courts, even 
after linkLine. 
Several scholars have argued in favor of including opportunity costs in predation cases.70 
For instance, Areeda and Hovenkamp support the inclusion of opportunity costs in predatory 
pricing tests under the following two conditions: first that such opportunity costs are easily 
identifiable and second that their inclusion does not lead to punishing a firm for a ‘failure to 
maximize’ its profits in the short run.71 In the context of a margin squeeze conduct, favoring a 
downstream sale instead of a short-run profit maximizing upstream sale can usually be said to fall 
in the range of easily identifiable opportunity costs, as it is defined by the duty to deal. 
 
C. EXCLUSIONARY EFFECTS 
In this section we elaborate on the second prong of our test. We show how the assessment of (the 
likelihood of) foreclosure of competitors in margin squeeze cases could reduce the risk of over-
deterrence. 
Recent economic analyses of margin squeeze conduct shows that it may have different 
effects on competition, competitors and consumers. For example, Jullien, Rey and Saavedra,72 
argue that the definition of margin squeeze in light of the AEC test encompasses two different 
types of conduct: exclusionary and exploitative margin squeezes. The first type of conduct, that 
                                                 
68 See, e.g., Heimler, supra note 7, and Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey and Claudia Saavedra, The Economics of Margin 
Squeeze, (CEPR Paper No. DP9905, 2014) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2444927 (visited June 2015). 
69 To see why this is the case, consider the (marginal cost based) Areeda-Turner test for a vertically integrated firm 
with upstream and downstream marginal costs, cu and c, respectively, which faces a downstream competitor buying 
its input and selling homogeneous retail products. The integrated firm has to set its retail price p such that: p ≥ cu + c. 
However, by undercutting its competitor’s retail price, it misses an upstream sale at price a, and, thus, an upstream 
profit of a - cu. If we include this opportunity cost in the above-mentioned test, it becomes: p ≥ (a - cu) + cu + c, 
which simplifies into the as-efficient imputation test, p ≥ a + c. 
70 It is important to note that the debate over above-cost predatory pricing has always been quite vivid amongst legal 
scholars and economists. In Section IV below, we review the different arguments on this topic and we explain why 
the traditional pitfalls of above-cost predatory pricing standards typically do not apply to vertically related markets 
were margin squeeze conducts take place. 
71 PHILLIP AREEDA AND HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION (Aspen Publishers 2008) ch. 7C-3; see also Hovenkamp, The Areeda-
Turner Test for Exclusionary Pricing: A Critical Journal, supra note 35 at pp. 13-14. See further WILLIAM J 
BAUMOL, Predatory Pricing and the Logic of the Average Variable Cost Test, 39(1) J. LAW ECON 49 (1996) 50, 
69-71 
72 Jullien, Rey and Saavedra, supra note 68. 
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of an exclusionary margin squeeze, occurs when the integrated firm sets both its upstream and 
downstream prices at such levels that a downstream competitor that is at least as efficient as the 
integrated firm cannot profitably remain in the market. There are several dynamic reasons why an 
integrated firm would find it profitable to engage in such conduct. First, it may undertake a 
predatory-like pricing strategy, leading to the exclusion of competitors at a sacrifice in the short-
run, in order to benefit from a dominant position at the downstream level in the long-run, thereby 
allowing for sacrifice recoupment. Several existing theories of predation can explain how the 
integrated firm could force downstream competitors to exit the market; e.g., signal jamming, 
financial predation with imperfect financial markets and reputation.73 The second explanation 
why an integrated firm would find it profitable to engage in an exclusionary margin squeeze 
conduct is provided by other foreclosure theories, which may hold irrespective of whether a duty 
to deal exists. Just like predation theories, these foreclosure theories also build on short-run 
sacrifice and supra-competitive profit (i.e., recoupment) following the exclusion of competitors. 
One example of such a theory is that of monopoly maintenance, whereby the dominant firm 
forecloses the downstream market in the short-run in order to prevent entry into the upstream 
market in the long-run.74 
It is important to highlight that in all the abovementioned economic theories of 
foreclosure, the notion of sacrifice is similar to that of predatory pricing, as long as the 
downstream prey is at least as efficient as the integrated firm. In fact, in this latter case, according 
to the Chicago School argument, the integrated firm would be better off in the short-run when 
selling only at the upstream level and allowing its more-efficient competitor to resell to final 
consumers. Therefore, by engaging in an exclusionary conduct, the integrated firm incurs losses 
or foregoes profits during the squeeze period, as the retail profits earned by serving the retail 
market alone are smaller than those that it could have obtained by selling at the upstream level. 
                                                 
73 See MOTTA, supra note 25, for a review of predatory pricing theories. In vertically-related markets, these theories 
of predatory pricing can occur at a price that is above the integrated firm’s marginal cost of production; see Gary 
Biglaiser and Patrick DeGraba, Downstream integration by a bottleneck input supplier whose regulated wholesale 
prices are above costs, 32 (2) RAND J. ECON. 302 (2001), for an example following the deep-pocket theory of 
predatory pricing. 
74 See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market 
Power in Evolving Industries, 33(2) RAND J. ECON. 134 (2002), and Yongmin Chen, Refusal to Deal, Intellectual 
Property Rights, and Antitrust, 30 J. L. ECON. AND ORGA. 533 (2014). One could conjecture that, according to a 
related theory, an exploitative margin squeeze leading to the marginalisation (rather than the exclusion) of 
competitors may also hamper long-run upstream competition, while maintain downstream competition. We are not 
aware, however, of any theory work along those lines. Moreover, as explained in the introduction, dynamic 
efficiency considerations are typically dealt with by regulatory authorities through ex ante tools rather than by ex 
post competition policy. 
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The exclusionary conduct can be profitable because the integrated firm’s pricing conduct may be 
constrained by the upstream duty to deal, hence preventing it from fully extracting surplus 
introduced by downstream firms and offering it incentives to monopolize the downstream 
market.75 
The second type of conduct Jullien, Rey and Saavedra identify, that of an exploitative 
margin squeeze, occurs when the integrated firm sets its prices at such levels that allow it to 
capture the surplus introduced by a more efficient entrant, which remains in the market. In fact, 
the integrated firm’s prices may be set at such levels that impede a hypothetical as efficient 
competitor from earning a positive profit, but allow an existing more efficient competitor, with 
lower costs, to do so. As explained by the Chicago School’s ‘single monopoly profit theory’, the 
integrated firm has no incentives to exclude a more efficient downstream competitor other than 
for predatory and foreclosure motives mentioned above, as long as it is able to capture the rent 
arising from its competitor’s superior technology. Nonetheless, even in this case it can still apply 
a margin squeeze by setting a low retail price its competitor will have to undercut in order to 
serve the market, hence increasing demand and capturing the profits through its upstream price.76 
In the case of an exploitative margin squeeze there is no exclusion of the rival from the 
downstream market. In fact, in the event of the competitor exiting the market, the integrated firm 
will end up earning a lower profit due to the fact that it will no longer be able to capture its 
surplus rent. 
Therefore, exploitative margin squeezes do not harm competition because the most 
efficient downstream firm always remains in the market. However, they may not be ‘fair’ to the 
competitor. This is because the integrated firm can leverage its – nonetheless constrained by the 
duty to deal – upstream market power into the downstream market by applying a margin squeeze, 
hence capturing the rent introduced by its rival’s technological advantage (i.e., its lower cost). 
Therefore, the latter does not fully benefit from its cost-advantage. In other words, exploitative 
margin squeezes harm the competitor, but not competition, as the most-efficient firm remains in 
                                                 
75 As our analysis involves an integrated firm that faces an upstream duty to deal, the result of the Chicago School’s 
Single Monopoly Profit Theory, according to which the integrated firm would have no incentive to force downstream 
entrants to exit the market, may not apply. This reasoning relates the well-known Bell doctrine; see Paul L. Joskow 
and Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications in Telecommunications, Electricity, and Other Network 
Industries, 51 STANFORD L. REV. 1249 (1999). 
76 In the game where the integrated firm and its competitor sell homogeneous products, there is a continuum of 
equilibria in which the integrated firm constrains its competitor to profitably serve consumers at a price lower than 
the sum of the input price and its own downstream cost, a+c; see, e.g. Carlton and Waldman, supra note 74. 
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the market. Finally, they benefit consumers by inducing lower retail prices they would not have 
been in a position to enjoy absent the pricing practice. By contrast, predatory margin squeezes, 
whereby equally or more efficient downstream competitors are excluded from the market, may 
harm competition. Overall, from an economic perspective, only margin squeezes that exclude 
competitors who are at least as efficient as the integrated firm would harm competition and lower 
total surplus. 
The risk of over-deterrence, however, is serious under EU laws, because exploitative 
margin squeezes can be banned. As explained above, the CJEU has explicitly stated that a margin 
squeeze occurs when a retail competitor operates ‘at a loss or at artificially reduced levels of 
profitability’, thereby defining ‘margin squeeze’ as a conduct that could leave a downstream 
competitor with a positive profit.77 This is in stark contrast to predatory pricing, where 
foreclosure (or likely foreclosure) of ‘actual or potential competitors’ 78 is required to assess the 
conduct. Assessing (likelihood of) foreclosure of competitors in margin squeeze cases would 
allow to distinguish between exploitative and exclusionary conducts and thus would reduce the 
risk of over-deterrence. As a result, an exploitative conduct, which allows the most-efficient 
downstream competitor to remain in the market and to serve final consumers, should not be 
prevented by competition laws because it brings larger total and consumer surplus in the form of 
lower prices.79  
In order to understand the risk of over-deterrence under EU laws, consider the following 
example. As above, a telecom network incumbent has upstream and downstream marginal costs 
of $5 and $20, respectively, and faces a duty to deal at a wholesale price of $10. Its downstream 
competitor is more efficient, with a marginal cost of $18, but has to rent one access line per retail 
customer. As explained above, the competitor must set a price above $28 in order to make a 
positive profit. Therefore, the incumbent can set a retail price of $29 without forcing its 
competitor to exit the market. The incumbent typically has an incentive to put such pressure on 
                                                 
77 See TeliaSonera, ¶ 33.  
78 Guidance on Article 102, ¶ 63. 
79 Note that in our examples there is a single downstream competitor to the dominant firm. If several firms with 
different efficiencies compete in a homogenous market, then the distinction between exploitative and exclusionary 
margin squeeze builds on whether the most-efficient competitor, i.e., the one serving the market, is foreclosed. 
Similarly, as long as the most-efficient competitor remains in a homogenous product market, a margin squeeze 
would only deter entry of potential competitors. Such potential competitors, however, would not be able to compete 
with the most-efficient competitor, even though they could be more efficient than the dominant integrated firm at the 
downstream level. 
21 
 
its competitor’s retail price, as this increases market demand and, therefore, its own upstream 
profits.80 
However, a strict application of the AEC test, as endorsed by the CJEU in TeliaSonera, 
would set a price floor of $30 to the incumbent’s retail price. An incumbent’s retail price of $29 
thus corresponds to an exploitative margin squeeze, and drives the retail market price down while 
avoiding any exclusionary effect. Therefore, when there is no distinction made between 
exclusionary and exploitative conducts and all margin squeezes are prohibited, a ban on margin 
squeeze prevent some pro-consumer effects. This corresponds to the ‘umbrella effect’. 
By contrast, following our approach, exclusionary effects of the conduct constitute a 
prerequisite to detect anticompetitive or monopolizing margin squeezes. Because a retail price of 
$29 is not exclusionary to the actual competitor, nor to any potential competitor that could serve 
the retail market in lieu of the actual one, it would not be prevented. 
All in all, the presence of a notion of exclusion in the assessment of alleged 
anticompetitive conducts is important in order to distinguish between exclusionary and 
exploitative margin squeezes. It follows that, authorities and courts should focus only on the 
former type of margin squeeze, which is potentially anticompetitive in the sense that it hampers 
competition. Because this notion is not always required in margin squeeze cases, but it does exist 
in predatory pricing (or a proxy of it), at least under EU laws, we believe this approach would 
help to prevent over-deterrence of pro-consumer exploitative margin squeezes. 
 
D. ADMINISTRABILITY OF THE RULE  
We assess the administrability of our suggested approach against the following three criteria: (1) 
that it can adapt to current laws in both the US and the EU; (2) that it can provide ex ante legal 
certainty for the firms; (3) that it is simple to use in the enforcement procedure. 
With respect to the first criterion, we argue that our approach can adapt to the current 
legal framework in the two jurisdictions. Under EU laws, a retail price below AVC is presumed 
predatory, in the sense that it implies exclusion of competitors and a market structure allowing 
for recoupment. Similarly, under our approach, a squeeze with a negative margin (i.e., wholesale 
price above retail price) is de facto exclusionary as it prevents any competitor to remain or enter 
                                                 
80 From an economic perspective, one may notice that the incumbent’s price of $29 does not correspond to a 
trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, in this example with homogeneous products and simultaneous timing. This 
could easily be circumvented by allowing, for instance, the incumbent to commit to its price before the entrant. For a 
discussion of margin squeeze in differentiated markets, see Jullien, Rey and Saavedra, supra note 68, Section 4. 
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the market. In addition, the assessment of foreclosure effects on the most efficient competitor is 
important in the case of squeezes with positive margins, in order to punish exclusionary conducts 
only, and not exploitative ones (under EU laws, recoupment is implied by the post-exclusion 
market structure and it is not required to be demonstrated). By contrast, under US laws, our 
approach mimics that of assessing predatory pricing, but with the important difference that the 
dominant firm’s retail price should be set below some measure of costs, which include 
opportunity costs of missed upstream sales. Hence, relying on adjusted-predatory pricing 
standards to evaluate margin squeeze does not alter the EU characterisation of margin squeeze as 
a ‘stand-alone’ abuse, while it results to margin squeeze being treated as a subcase of predatory 
pricing in the US. 
Furthermore, our suggested price-cost test for margin squeeze is aligned with the 
treatment of margin squeeze as a price-based exclusionary strategy, in light of the European 
Commission’s classification of price and non-price related exclusionary abuses81 and the relevant 
case law.82 
With respect to the second criterion, our approach promotes ex ante legal certainty for the 
firms in the sense that all test parameters – including the opportunity cost that is defined by the 
duty to deal – are known to the firms. Hence, the suggested test may inform the firms which 
pricing conducts will be infringement of the law and which will not, before they make their 
pricing decisions.83 
Finally, our approach should be relatively simple to use during the enforcement 
procedure. It is a straightforward exercise to implement the two prongs of the test and it does not 
                                                 
81 Guidance on Article 102, ¶ 23-27. A consequence of this classification is the adoption of cost-based tests as filters 
for antitrust enforcement in the area of price-based exclusionary conducts. 
82 Deutsche Telekom 2010, ‘in order to assess whether the pricing practices of a dominant undertaking are likely to 
eliminate a competitor contrary to Article 82 EC, it is necessary to adopt a test based on the costs and the strategy of 
the dominant undertaking itself (...) a dominant undertaking cannot drive from the market undertakings which are 
perhaps as efficient as the dominant undertaking but which, because of their smaller financial resources, are 
incapable of withstanding the competition waged against them’, ¶ 198-199; Post Danmark, ‘Thus, Article [102 
TFEU] prohibits a dominant undertaking from, among other things, adopting pricing practices that have an 
exclusionary effect on competitors considered to be as efficient as it is itself and strengthening its dominant position 
by using methods other than those that are part of competition on the merits. Accordingly, in that light, not all 
competition by means of price may be regarded as legitimate’, ¶ 5; Judgment of the General Court (Seventh 
Chamber) of 12 June 2014 - Intel Corp v European Commission (Case T-286/09) (not yet published) currently under 
appeal at the Court of Justice C-413/14 P, ¶ 98-99. 
83 The incumbent may not know the cost of its downstream competitors. It is, however, unlikely that an incumbent 
involuntarily excludes an entrant from the downstream market while it was trying to exploit its surplus through an 
exploitative margin squeeze. Indeed, an incumbent is generally careful not to exclude its competitors when engaging 
in exploitative margin squeeze conducts, as it benefits from their presence in the downstream market and would earn 
less if this market was monopolized. 
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require complex analysis or hypothetical economic assessments regarding the opportunity cost 
when the integrated firm faces a duty to deal and upstream prices are known to all parties. This is 
especially the case in the context of regulated industries, where there exists a track record of 
cases and longstanding experience in dealing with the pricing practices of the incumbent. 
Probably, the most daunting aspect of our test is that it requires enforcers to take into account 
opportunity costs ex post, i.e. after the conduct has taken place. This departs from the existing 
approach in competition proceedings whereby opportunity costs are typically used ex ante in 
order to evaluate firm’s incentives. This could sometimes prove challenging in non-regulated 
industries where the upstream price – which corresponds to the opportunity cost – is not always 
clearly defined. This might explain the limited use of opportunity costs so far in abuse cases, 
including predatory pricing cases, as we shall see in the following section. 
 
 
IV. FURTHER SUPPORT TO AN ABOVE-COST PREDATORY PRICING APPROACH 
In this part we address several possible criticisms to our approach. The first one relates to the 
antitrust treatment of above-cost predatory pricing strategies. We review the arguments against 
the use of above-cost predatory pricing tests and we explain why these do not hold in vertically 
related markets where margin squeezes take place. The second one relates the limited 
institutional capacity of the adjudicative process to consider opportunity costs. We explain why 
such an approach could be administered by the courts by reviewing previous case law. 
 
A. ABOVE-COST PREDATORY PRICING STANDARDS IN VERTICALLY-RELATED 
MARKETS 
There is a long-standing debate on whether above-cost price cuts should be punished as predatory 
under antitrust laws.84 The two opposing views generally rely on arguments related to under- and 
over-deterrence of monopolizing or anticompetitive pricing strategies. The analyses provided by 
Edlin and Elhauge help to summarize the state of the art of this debate.85 Edlin argues in favor of 
                                                 
84 See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L. J. 284 (1977); 
William J. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE 
L. J. 1 (1979); William J. Baumol, Predation and the Logic of the Average Variable Cost Test, 39 J. L. & ECON. 49 
(1996); and Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L. J. 2239 (2000). 
85 Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L. J. 941 (2002), and Einer Elhauge, Why 
Above-Cost Price Cuts To Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory –and the Implications for Defining Costs and 
Market Power, 122 YALE L. J. 681 (2003). 
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assessing above-cost price cuts as predatory under some circumstances (e.g., when the dominant 
firm engages in substantial price cuts right after entry), whereas Elhauge takes the opposing view 
and argues against such an assessment. Punishing pricing conducts that are above-cost is not a 
simple task, because, as Elhauge puts it, one should identify such a monopolizing or 
anticompetitive conduct ‘in a way antitrust law can regulate without having unduly negative 
effects on other desirable conduct’.86 In this section, we attempt to tackle this issue in the specific 
case where a dominant firm owns an essential wholesale product and faces competition in a 
downstream market. In particular, we show that classic arguments in favor of a de facto 
lawfulness of above-cost pricing cuts do not hold in vertically related markets. 
The first type of arguments in favor of the lawfulness of above-cost pricing reflects 
administrability concerns. As Carlton puts it, courts have determined ‘that a legal rule that would 
purport to penalize only predatory above-cost pricing would (1) be difficult to administer; (2) be 
unpredictable in application and therefore difficult for businesses to follow; and (3) discourage 
pro-consumer price cutting’.87 
Whereas we share the administrability concerns as the latter arise in the general context of 
predatory pricing, our aim here is to show that the vertical structure in which margin squeeze 
takes place allows overcoming such concerns. This is owing to two reasons. First, above-cost 
predatory pricing, when including opportunity costs due to missed upstream sales, is not 
particularly difficult to administer, nor unpredictable. In fact, the opportunity cost is easily 
identified, as it corresponds to the upstream revenue the dominant firm foregoes when it engages 
in a margin squeeze and serves the retail market in lieu of its competitor. The corresponding costs 
and upstream prices, over which there is a duty to deal enforced by courts, are known to the 
dominant firm. 
The last point raised by Carlton – that above-cost predatory pricing standards could 
discourage pro-consumer price cutting – relates to the efficiency of the competitive process. It is 
also one of Elhauge’s main arguments against above-cost predatory pricing standards. He states 
that ‘the price floors, where they have bite, will prevent the incumbent from adopting above-cost 
price cuts that lower prices as much as they otherwise would have’ when competing with more-
efficient entrants.88 However, as we explained in Section III, pro-consumer price-cutting is 
                                                 
86 Elhauge, supra note 85, at p. 702. 
87 Carlton, supra note 20 at p. 274. 
88 Elhauge, supra note 85, p. 774. 
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typically not discouraged when assessing margin squeeze conducts that involve an exclusionary 
strategy. This relates to Elhauge’s argument, according to which only ‘variable costs of the 
alleged predatory increase in output that displaces the rival’s output’ should be considered.89 
Indeed, a focus on these costs, which correspond to diverting rival’s output (that is to an 
exclusionary margin squeeze conduct) does not hamper the dominant’s firm ability to engage in a 
pro-consumer exploitative conduct in vertically related markets. 
Elhauge also mentions another argument related to efficiency motives when explaining 
that an above-cost predatory pricing approach could favor entry of less-efficient competitors (p. 
766-770). However, according to our approach, these entrants would be undercut by the 
incumbent in vertically-related markets (or they would be unable to serve the market because of 
an existing more-efficient competitor), as the price floor set by the AEC test resulting from 
inclusion of opportunity costs has no bite on less-efficient entrants.90 
Overall, the specificities of vertically related markets, in which margin squeezes take 
place, help to address the main issues related to assessing and punishing anticompetitive or 
monopolizing above-cost predatory pricing conducts. 
 
B. CASE LAW IN SUPPORT 
While the equivalence of the Areeda-Turner test and to the AEC test, when one accounts for 
opportunity costs, is not a new topic,91 what has been underexplored is whether this approach 
could be supported from a legal perspective. This section will discuss the cases where EU and US 
courts and authorities considered opportunity costs. 
 
1. US Perspective 
The main case supporting the use of opportunity costs is the US Sixth Circuit’s Spirit (2005)92 
decision in the airline industry. In Spirit, the defendant (Northwest) had allegedly both lowered 
its price and shifted additional capacity (aircrafts) into targeted routes the plaintiff (Spirit) had 
just entered in order to force the latter to exit these routes. The Court considered an incremental 
                                                 
89 Id. 711-712. 
90 Id. Elhauge himself recognizes this possibility, stating that ‘[d]epending on market circumstances, it might be that 
the price floors (…) are below the price an unrestricted incumbent would want to charge post-entry anyway. In those 
cases, though, the restrictions have no bite’, p. 762, fn 219. 
91 See, e.g. Jullien, Rey and Saavedra, supra note 68, at p. 20. 
92 Spirit Airlines v Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir 2005). 
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version of the Brooke Group cost test93 and laid down two tests: first a test based on whether total 
revenues exceeded total variable costs for all flights on a given route and second a test that 
compared whether the incremental profits that resulted from the addition of capacity (aircraft) to 
certain routes exceeded the incremental costs of adding this capacity. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit 
in US v. American Airlines Case94 (AMR) – a case brought by the Department of Justice 
pertaining to a similar factual situation with that of the Spirit case – also considered an 
incremental version of the Brooke Group test.95 The defendant (AMR), which was the dominant 
carrier with about 70% of the traffic at the Dallas/Fort Worth hub airport, when faced with 
competition on its routes by new entrants lowered its own prices to match those of the new 
entrants and increased the number of its own flights on the same routes. When the new carrier 
abandoned its routes, AMR raised its prices and returned to its pre-entry scheduled flights. In 
both of these cases the courts considered measures of opportunity cost instead of accounting 
based measures of cost, as part of the incremental costs of expanding output. While the use of 
such a measure of opportunity cost – i.e. the opportunity costs deriving from the dominant 
carrier’s strategy to add additional capacity (aircrafts) on the targeted routes, earning less during 
the predation period – had been rejected by the Court in the AMR decision, the Spirit Court 
accepted foregone revenues as part of the incremental costs of expanding output.96 
It may be argued that the inclusion of concepts such as opportunity costs reduce the 
administrability of the Brooke Group rule. Areeda and Hovenkamp also stress that the use of 
opportunity cost can in theory send courts on ‘ill defined fishing expeditions in search of 
hypothetical more profitable investments that a firm might have made’.97 However, they clarify 
that this criticism does not apply in industries, such as airlines, where the shift of capacity in 
these cases involves identifiable shifts of aircrafts from one market to another, hence making 
calculation of the opportunity cost of foregone revenues feasible. Likewise, as already discussed 
(III B), in the case of margin squeeze conduct, favoring a downstream sale instead of short-run 
                                                 
93 Id. at 938. (‘Therefore, the assessment of predation compares the revenues (the price) Northwest received from this 
tactic versus the incremental (or average variable cost) Northwestern incurred from carrying those passengers’). 
94 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003). 
95 Aaron S. Edlin and Joseph Farrell, ‘The American Airlines Case: A Chance to Clarify Predation Policy’, in THE 
ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION AND POLICY (John E. Kwoka and Lawrence J. 
White eds., 4th edn, OUP 2001) 502-527. 
96 AREEDA AND HOVENKAMP, supra note 65 (2006 Supp) at pp. 304-11. 
97 Id. at p. 309. 
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profit maximizing upstream sale typically falls in the range of easily identifiable opportunity 
costs. 
 
2. EU Perspective 
In the EU, there has not yet been a judgment discussing the possible inclusion of opportunity 
costs. The Commission’s 2009 Guidance document, however, does not seem to exclude such a 
possibility. The Commission does not link the concept of sacrifice to a particular cost 
benchmark.98 It relies on the average avoidable cost (AAC) as the starting point and refuses to 
compare the ‘actual conduct with hypothetical or theoretical alternatives’ which, ‘taking into 
account the market conditions and business realities facing the dominant undertaking can 
realistically be expected to be more profitable’.99 This paragraph could be interpreted as allowing 
the consideration of opportunity costs, but not in a way that would punish firms for failure to 
maximize their profits. 
While the inclusion of opportunity cost analysis remains quite embryonic in the EU case 
law, a small number of European Commission decisions have already taken opportunity costs 
into account. First, in the parallel Scandlines and Sundbusserne decisions concerning allegedly 
exploitative pricing, the Commission, for the first time, elaborated on its own method of 
assessment of unfairly high pricing, which included opportunity costs.100 There, the Commission 
dismissed complaints brought by ferry companies (Scandlines Sverige and Sundbusserne) of 
excessive and discriminatory port fees charged by the Port of Helsingborg (HHAB). In particular, 
the ferry companies claimed that HHAB was levying excessive and discriminatory charges for 
services provided to ferry operators by treating the port as a single economic and operational unit 
and that HHAB’s charges were not cost-based. To determine the abuse, the Commission had to 
evaluate the twofold United Brands101 test: (i) whether the price-cost margin was excessive (i.e. 
whether the HHAB’s port fees were excessive compares to the costs incurred by the port in 
providing services and facilities to ferry operators on the Helsingborg-Elsinore route); and (ii) 
                                                 
98 Guidance on Article 102, ¶ 63-64. 
99 Id. ¶ 65. 
100 See Case COMP/A.36.568/D3, Scandlines Sverige AB v Port of Helsingborg (Brussels, 23 July 2004) at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_36568 (visited June 2015) and Case 
COMP/A.36.570/D3, Sundbusserne v Port of Helsingborg (Brussels, 23 July 2004) at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_36570 (visited June 2015). The first case 
was challenged before the General Court in case T-399/04, Scandlines Sverige AB v Commission [2005] OJ C6/40, 
and was subsequently closed. 
101 Case 27/76, United Brands Co. v Commission of the European Communities, 1978 ECR 207, 
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whether the price imposed was ‘either unfair in itself or when compared to competing 
products’.102 The Commission, however, did not establish whether HHAB’s price-cost margin 
was excessive, because in assessing the fairness of the price the Commission investigated 
whether the price charged had a reasonable relation to the ‘economic value’ of the service 
supplied.103 In doing so, the Commission considered it necessary to take into account not only the 
costs incurred by the port in providing its services, but also additional costs, such as sunk costs 
and opportunity costs incurred by the city of Helsingborg, if it had used the land of the port for 
different purposes.104  
Second, the Commission discussed opportunity costs in its decision on the Deutsche 
Börse/NYSE Euronext merger.105 The EC prohibited the proposed merger between the two 
companies – operating the two largest exchanges for financial derivatives in the world – because 
of its harmful effects on the sub-market for European financial derivatives. The Commission 
found that the companies held a significant market share on this sub-market. Hence, the proposed 
merger was blocked on the grounds that it would create a quasi-monopoly in European financial 
derivatives traded globally on exchanges that would, in turn, lead to significant harm to 
derivative users and the European economy. The case largely turned on the issue of market 
definition, and in particular whether over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives (made directly between 
two investors) and exchange-traded derivatives (ETDs) were part of the same market. The 
Commission disagreed with the assertion of the notifying parties that OTCs and ETDs belonged 
in the same market and found that they do not compete with each other. It concluded that ETDs 
typically amount to around €100,000 per trade and are standardised whereas OTC derivatives 
amount to around €200m and are customised to meet buyer and seller requirements. The 
Commission thus focused its analysis on the ETDs markets where parties found to have a 
combined market share of 90%. 
The opportunity costs were considered in several stages of the reasoning process. First, in 
the course of the market definition of ETDs. In calculating the trading cost of ETDs the 
                                                 
102 Id. ¶ 250-252. 
103 On this point see the criticism of Pinar Akman and Luke Garrod, When are Excessive Prices Unfair? (2011) 7(2) 
J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 403, 425. 
104 Scandlines, ¶ 209, 234-235, and Sundbusserne, ¶ 185, 209-210. This was rejected in subsequent costs 
calculations, not because this was inaccurate, but because the costs for the city should not be taken into account as 
costs for the port authority HHAB; Scandlines, ¶ 211, and Sundbusserne, ¶ 187. 
105 Case COMP/M. 6166 [2011], Deutsche Börse/NYSE Euronext merger (Brussels, 1 February 2012) at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6166_20120201_20610_2711467_EN.pdf (visited June 
2015). 
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Commission did not only refer to the explicit elements of such a transaction (i.e. membership fees 
as well as per transaction clearing and trading fees) but also to the implicit elements such as the 
realised bid-ask spread, the market impact and the opportunity cost of posting collateral (¶ 229 
and 501). Also, in establishing whether a link exists between trading and clearing services (¶ 237-
243). Finally, in the assessment stage of the parties’ proposed remedies addressing the 
Commission’s concerns. One of the efficiency claims put forward by the notifying parties to the 
transaction related to the collateral savings that would arise in the case the proposed merger was 
approved. The Commission argued that such savings do not represent actual efficiencies for 
clearing members. This is because the relevant metric in quantifying efficiency as a cost saving is 
the opportunity cost. The Commission argued that it ‘is not the collateral savings but the 
opportunity cost of holding cash or securities posted as collateral which is the relevant measure of 
actual cost savings from lower collateral requirements’.106 Grouping together collateral cost 
savings estimates with other cost savings such as IT and user access cost savings, as the parties 
did, was found inappropriate, as the opportunity cost of holding cash or collateral, rather than 
collateral savings as such determine the actual cost savings for the customers.107 
Finally, in the Telefónica decision,108 issued against the Spanish telecommunications 
incumbent for alleged margin squeeze between its national and regional wholesale charges to its 
broadband network and its retail prices for broadband access, the Commission took into account 
opportunity costs when defining the relevant wholesale markets. In particular, the Commission 
resorted to the opportunity cost analysis in order to assess the substitutability between the 
regional wholesale offer and the national wholesale offers. It argued that, contrary to Telefónica’s 
submissions regarding the substitutability of these two offers, switching from a regional to a 
national wholesale offer would make little economic sense. This is because operators that had 
already invested in the roll-out of a regional network to connect with the different access points 
would be unlikely to ‘bear the opportunity cost of not using their network and use a national 
wholesale offer which does not allow them the same possibilities in terms of control over the 
quality of service of the retail product as the regional wholesale offer’. 109 
                                                 
106 Id ¶ 1190. 
107 Id ¶ 1190-1192. 
108 See supra note 42. 
109 Id ¶ 187. 
30 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this article we have presented a novel legal approach to the assessment of margin squeeze 
conduct. We showed that assessing margin squeeze conducts through an above-cost predatory 
pricing standard, which (i) includes opportunity-costs due to missed upstream sales in the price-
cost test and (ii) requires the margin squeeze conduct to be exclusionary, could minimise both the 
risks of over- and under-deterrence. This could, in turn, reduce the gap between current US and 
EU antitrust stances on this issue. We have also explained why the intrinsic specificities of 
vertically related markets in which margin squeezes take place overcome classic concerns about 
antitrust assessment of above-costs predation. Finally, we have provided a discussion of the 
relevant case law and decision practice supporting our approach. 
One could possibly consider further extensions to our approach. For instance, our analysis 
focuses on cases where there is a duty to deal that is enforced by courts. This includes a 
regulatory duty to deal in the EU, but not in the US. A natural extension of our analysis would 
thus be to consider the case of margin squeeze when there is no such duty to deal enforced by the 
Courts.110 Furthermore, our economic analysis builds on the case of homogeneous markets. In 
differentiated markets, the evaluation of the opportunity costs deriving from a margin squeeze 
strategy would imply calculating firms’ products diversion ratios. This task, for instance, is 
undertaken by competition authorities in merger analysis.111 A full characterization of margin 
squeeze in differentiated markets would then provide useful in such circumstances. Finally, 
including opportunity costs in the assessment of a margin squeeze conduct, while it is relatively 
simple when the dominant firm is vertically integrated (as in our analysis), it may still invite the 
broader question of which cost measure and base should be analysed under antitrust laws. 
                                                 
110 See Steven C. Salop, Refusals to Deal and Price Squeezes by an Unregulated, Vertically Integrated Monopolist, 
76 (3) ANTITRUST L. J. 709 (2010) and Bouckaert and Verboven, supra note 66, for a presentation of the relevant 
issues in this setting.  
111 See, e.g., Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, Critical Loss: Let's Tell the Whole Story, 17 ANTITRUST 
MAGAZINE 49 (2003); see Jullien, Rey and Saavedra, supra note 68, p. 30 for a discussion of the AEC test 
including the diversion ratio. 
